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            COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

 

Breadth of claims; lack of support - A class of "Amino-substituted tetracyclic

compound's is claimed. Examiner objected to the number of compounds covered.

Applicant amended to find support - accepted. Proposed claims were considered

not to go beyond sound prediction of utility for the class claimed; claims are

allowable in principle - Objection reversed in part.

 

This decision deals with a request for a review by the Commissioner of Patents

of an examiner's Final Action under Rule 47 of the Patent Rules, dated July 24,

1980 on application serial number 318,927 (class 260-200.1). The application

which is a divisional application of application 199,996 (since issued to Canadian

Patent 1,051,877) has an effective filing date of May 15, 1974 and is entitled

"AMINO-SUBSTITUTED TETRACYCLIC COMPOUNDS".

 

The application under review relates to processes and compounds which are

intermediates to the processes and products claimed in the parent case. The

intermediate compounds are, themselves, described as being pharmacologically active

and the final products are medicinal compounds.

 

In the Final Action the examiner made three objections to the claims in the

divisional, as follows:

 

(1) claims 1 to 5, 28 and 29 are too broad in view of the disclosure

(2) claim 1 includes inoperative subject matter

(3) claims 9 to 20, 25 to 27, 32 to 37, 40 and 41 lack support in the disclosure

 

In response to the Final Action, Applicant suggested an amendment which would over-

come objections (2) and (3) above and would at the same time substitute proposed

claims 1 to 5, 13 and 14 for claims 1 to 5, 28 and 29 at present in the case. (An

obvious typographical error in proposed claim 1 was corrected by a telephone call

to Applicant's agent.) The Board recommends that the part of the amendment that

overcomes the examiner's (2) and (3) be accepted and we will not consider these

objections further. This leaves for consideration proposed claims 1 to 5, 13 and

14 which, according to the examiner, are not allowable because of the number of

compounds they cover.

 

The examiner has required that the broad process and product claims be restricted

to cover only compounds that he considers have been adequately disclosed and

exemplified. Applicant disagree with the examiner and has asked the Commissioner

of Patents to review the Final Action and to find that claims of the breadth he

has proposed are, in principle, allowable to him.

 

The position taken by the examiner in his Final Action is shown in the

following passage:

 

...

 

The examiner contends however that applicant is not

necessarily entitled to claims for the

intermediates of the general formula (XII) of

equivalent scope as those obtained for the final

product (I) of the parent patent. The parent

patent discloses and claims several methods of

preparing the final products of general formula (I)

many of which do not involve intermediates of

formula (XII) at all. In fact claim 1 of the

patent defines seven alternative methods of

preparing the final products of general formula (I)

each starting with a different starting material.

Of these seven processes only one involves

intermediates of general formula (XII), that is,

process (g) wherein compounds of general formula

(XII) may be used as intermediates in the

preparation of starting material (VIII). Even in

this process it is not essential that compounds of

general formula (XII) be used. Reference to page

7, lines 2 to 4 of the patent is made which

indicates that in the preparation of the primary

amide of formula VIII the preparation of the

corresponding carboxyl compound (compound of

general formula XII) may be completely bypassed.

It is clear from reviewing the parent patent that a

large proportion of the processes disclosed and

exemplified for preparing the compounds of general

formula (I) do not utilize the intermediates of

general formula (XII) claimed in this application.

The fact that applicant was able to obtain broad

claims to the compound of general formula (I) which

are based on processes through routes other than

those utilizing compounds of general formula (XII)

does not in itself entitle applicant to claims to

compounds of general formula (XII) of equivalent

scope.

 

Applicant is entitled to claims to compounds of

general formula (XII) which are adequately

disclosed and exemplified by the disclosure. The

only such compounds are those of general formula

(XII) wherein rings A and B are unsubstituted and X

is oxygen or -CH2-. Claims 1 to 5, 28 and 29 must

be restricted accordingly.

 

The general formula (XII) is

 

(see formula I)  

and in the proposed claims X represents oxygen, sulphur, the group

= NR7 or the group - CH2-; rings A and B may have as substituents a

halogen, an alkoxy group of 1 to 4 carbon atoms, an alkyl group of 1 to

4 carbon atoms and a hydroxy group; ring B may also have a

trifluoromethyl group; R7 represents hydrogen or methyl and n is 1 or

2. The restrictions required by the examiner are shown in the second

paragraph quoted above from his Final Action.

 

In the above passage the examiner was responding to Applicant's

argument that the divisional application should be allowed with claims

of "equivalent" scope to those allowed and issued to patent in the

parent case. The examiner thus made it plain that his objection is

based on the relationship between the claims and disclosure of this

divisional application, and not on a relationship between the claims of

this application and the specification of the parent case.

 

The Board would like to point out that Section 38(3) says, in part:

 

Such divisional applications shall be deemed to be

separate and distinct applications under this Act,

to which the provisions thereof apply as fully as

may be...

 

Since the provisions of the Act apply to this divisional "as fully as

may be" the Board considers that this specification must meet the

provisions of the Act independently, without relying on the parent case

for information contained in the parent but not present in the

divisional application. The Board is therefore of the opinion that

Applicant's argument based on what has been allowed in the parent case

and what is an "equivalent" claim in this case has no bearing on the

question of what should be allowed in this divisional application.

 

During the prosecution, Applicant argued that a sound prediction can be

made that a person skilled in the art would be able to convert all the

intermediates into the final products claimed in the parent case. The

examiner has not disputed the soundness of this prediction. He has,

however, maintained that useful pharmacological activity, on which

invention is predicated, either for the compounds in their own right as

medicinals or as intermediates for other medicinal compounds, cannot be

predicted for the number of compounds claimed from the few that have

been disclosed. To meet this objection, Applicant has argued for what

he calls the "dual utility" of these intermediates. On one hand they

are medicinal compounds but on the other hand they are simply chemical

entities prepared on the route to the final products, and as such their

predictability is greater than it would be in the difficult-to-predict

medicinal arts.

 

The Board has no doubt after reading pages 1, 2 and 3 of this

disclosure that the substances defined by general formula (XII) are

prepared by chemical processes and that the ultimate utility of the new

intermediate compounds is clearly, directly or indirectly, dependent on

medicinal properties. We do not agree, therefore, with Applicant's

argument for a "dual utility" that should cause these compounds to be

viewed as medicinal subject matter in one light but as mere chemical

entities in another. We think that these intermediates are firmly in

the area of compounds intended for medicine as envisaged by the Patent

Act.

 

In Monsanto Company v. The Commissioner of Patents (1979) S.C.R. at

1121, the Supreme Court said:

 

In my opinion the Commissioner cannot refuse a

patent because the inventor has not fully tested

and proved it in all its claimed applications.

 

This has since been elaborated by the recent decision in Ciba-Geigy v.

Commissioner of Patents, Federal Court, Hay 28, 1982. With these cases

in mind, the Board is of the opinion that the examiner's requirement

that the claims be restricted to what Applicant has exemplified goes

too far and should not be upheld by the Commissioner. The examiner

would also restrict the claims to what he considers to be adequately

disclosed, in fact the examiner has linked the objections of inadequate

disclosure and exemplification together. The Board notes that the

compounds are defined in exactly the same terms, or in the case of X in

narrower terms, in the claims as in the disclosure and, consequently,

we think the claimed subject matter has in fact been disclosed. Since

the general formula (XII) and its associated definitions are sufficient

to identify the subject matter claimed and disclosed, the Board

considers that what is being claimed has also been "adequately"

disclosed or, in patent jargon, the claims are supported by the

disclosure. We recommend therefore that the requirements made by the

examiner based on inadequacy of disclosure and exemplification should

not be upheld.

 

The question of how broadly claims may be drawn in terms of chemical

classes, where actual preparation and testing is necessarily limited,

by practical considerations, to certain members of the classes and

consequently physical data are not available for all the compounds

covered by the claims is a difficult one to resolve. It has been

examined many times by the courts. See for example Hoechst v. Gilbert,

(1966) S.C.R. 189, where the Supreme Court adopted the view that no one

may obtain a valid patent for an unproved and untested hypothesis in an

uncharted field; or B.V.D. v. Canadian Celanese, (1936) Ex. C.R. 139,

and 1937 S.C.R. 221 where the courts spoke about claims going beyond

the invention. In Boehringer Sohn v. Bell Craig, (1962) Ex. C.R. 339,

it was said that an inventor cannot patent more than he has invented

and in Rh“ne Poulenc v. Gilbert, claims were held invalid because

substances claimed had never been made or tested. It is thus clear

that there are limits to what may be claimed as the invention in any

particular case. Even in Monsanto, which Applicant has cited, where

the Commissioner was directed to allow an application to issue to

patent for a group of compounds, not all of which had been prepared or

tested, the Supreme Court would not go beyond a "reasonably sound"

prediction into the area of speculation.

 

Notwithstanding the Monsanto case where it was said:

...what is meant by a "sound prediction". It

cannot mean a certainty since it does not exclude

all risk that some of the area covered may prove

devoid of utility.

 

and also:

 

...the Board, in spite of a complete absence of any

evidence of unsoundness of the prediction, deny the

claims and would in the end limit them to the area

of proven utility instead of allowing them to the

extent of predicted utility. In my view this is

contrary to S. 42 of the Patent Act.

 

the courts have, on several occasions, cautioned against overclaiming.

See, for example, Gilbert v. Sandoz, 64 C.P.R. 37,

 

Indeed one may even be disposed to wonder why such

blatant assertions of the usefulness of large

classes of substances, most of which obviously have

never been made, should appear in patent

specifications or why applications for patents

based on such wild assertions are not rejected out

of hand as being palpably false.

and also Farbwerhe Hoechst v. The Commissioner of Patents, (1966) Ex.

C.R.

 

Applicants...deliberately set out to monopolize

what was for the most part an unexplored field of

organic chemistry so as to prevent others during

the life of the patent from exercising their right

to search in that field for... new substances.

 

Neither of these cautionary statements appears to be a fair comment on

this application. The Board takes the view that the definitions of the

substituents on rings A and B in formula (XII) are acceptable. They appear

to us to cover the usual, simple substituents commonly included in patent

specifications to cautiously embrace closely related compounds and, since

we cannot say they are obviously false, we regard them as unobjectionable.

We have some doubt about the definitions of X to include nitrogen and

sulphur as hetero atoms even though such compounds are disclosed. These

definitions may cover more than a single class of compounds and may be thought

to cover several classes but, in the absence of any evidence that nitrogen

and sulphur heterocycles lack utility, we are prepared to give the benefit

of the doubt to Applicant.

 

Accordingly, the Board recommends that the Commissioner finds proposed

claims 1 to 5, 13 and 14 allowable in principle.

 

G. A. Asher                         A. McDonough

Chairman                            Member

Patent Appeal Board, Canada

 

I have reviewed the prosecution of this application and concur with the

reasoning and findings of the Board. Accordingly, I direct that prosecution

should be resumed on the basis of the amended specification.

 

J.H.A. Gariepy

Commissioner of Patents

 

Dated at Hull, Quebec

this 12th. day of November, 1982

 

Agent for Applicant

 

Fetherstonhaugh & Co.

Box 299, Station D

Ottawa, Ont.

K1P 5Y6

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