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                     COMMISSIONERS DECISION

 

Subject Matter - Section 2 - Bovine Cell Line

 

Applicants claim to a continuous cell line useful to produce insulin was rejected

as to unpatentable subject matter, being a form of living matter. The claims

were allowed for the reasons advanced in C.D. 933. Rejection reversed.

 

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Patent application 291870 (Class 195-46), was filed on November 28, 1977 by

Connaught Laboratories Ltd., of Willowdale, Ontario, assignee of the invent-

ors George M. Healy et al. It is directed to a "Continuous Bovine Beta

Cell Line." Claims 1-7 were rejected on October 10, 1980. The rejection was

reviewed by the Patent Appeal Board, which held a Hearing on April 15, 1981

to consider the rejection. At the Hearing Connaught Laboratories was represent-

ed by Mr. Michael I. Stewart, of the firm of Sim & McBurney.

 

In claims 1-7 of the application, the Applicant is claiming a new bovine cell

line useful to produce insulin. These claims were refused under Section 2 of

the Patent Act for being directed to living matter. Claims 3 and 4 are typical.

 

3. A cell culture of a continuous bovine beta-cell line

for the production of insulin in association with a nutrient

culture medium, said cell line having a morphology very

similar to that of beta cells of the bovine pancreas, the

diploid number of chromosomes for the bovine species, a

generation time of not more than 24 hours and is capable of

producing insulin.

 

4. The cell culture of claim 3 wherein said cell line

is one as deposited with the American Type Culture Collection

under accession number ATCC CRL 1407.

 

The issue is whether such claims are patentable. Mr. Stewart presented several

convincing reasons why they should be allowed, but we need not go into them

extensively. In another case heard shortly before the present one, the same

question arose. That involved patent application 257177 of the Abitibi

Company, for which a Hearing took place on March 11, 1981. Mr. David Watson, Q.C.,

represented Abitibi. The arguments both of Mr. Stewart and of Mr. Watson,

together with the results of our own investigation of the development of

patent law throughout the world, have brought us to the conclusion that

we can no longer be satisfied that at law a patent for a microorganism

or other new life forms would not be held allowable by our own courts.

That is the criterion specified in Section 42 of the Patent Act, without

which the Commissioner ought not to reject an application.

 

The decision in the Abitibi case was taken on March 18, 1982, and is now

a public document. It is consequently not necessary to repeat here all the

ratiocination developed there. However it may be useful to repeat from it

the requirements which we think should be met by an Applicant before claims

such as 1-7 of the application should be allowed. In it we said:

 

It is of some importance, we think, to recognize how far our

recommendation, if accepted, will carry us, and we believe

clear guidelines should be set down for the benefit both of

applicants and examiners. Certainly this decision will extend

to all microorganisms, yeasts, molds, fungi, bacteria,

actinomycetes, unicellular algae, cell lines, viruses or

protozoa; in fact to all new life forms which are produced en

masse as chemical compounds are prepared, and are formed

in such large numbers that any measurable quantity will possess

uniform properties and characteristics. That is, for example,

the working standard of the Japanese Patent Office (see Japan

Patents & Trademarks, No. 27, the Suzuye Report, Nov. 1980:

 

The standards state that microorganisms, such as

yeast, mold, fungi, bacteria, actinonomycetes,

unicellular algae, virus or protozoa, can be the

subject of patent protection.

 

We can see no justifiable reason for distinguishing between these

life forms when deciding the question of patentable subject matter.

Whether it reaches up to higher life forms - plants (in the popular

sense) or animals - is more debatable. Certainly the U.S. Court

of Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court shied away

from that extrapolation. For example in the first Bergy decision,

In re Bergy et al, U.S.C. CPA, Oct 6, 1977, Judge Kashwa,

concurring, said:

 

I agree with the result and the reasoning of the opinion

by Judge Rich joined by Chief Judge Markey. Nevertheless,

I wish to emphasize, out of a super-abundance of caution,

that I read the majority opinion as setting forth an

extremely limited holding. While the PTO and the dissenting

opinion raise the specter of patenting higher forms of

living organisms, quite clearly the majority opinion does

not support such a broad proposition. Each case must

necessarily be considered on its own facts. On the facts

of this case, I join the narrower confines of the majority

opinion.

 

The majority opinion stated (at p. 18):

 

...The nature and commercial uses of biologically pure

cultures of microorganisms ... are much more akin to

inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents,

and catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or

raspberries and roses...

 

...they have come to be used to produce a vast variety of

chemicals and drugs such as alcohols, ketone, fatty acids,

amino acids, vitamins... and enzymes... In short, microorganisms

have come to be important tools in the chemical industry...

and when a new and useful tangible industrial tool is invented

which is unobvious, so that it complies with the prerequisite

to patentability...we do not see any reason to deprive it or

its creator or owner of the protection and advantage of the

patent system...As for the board's fears that our holding

will of necessity, or "logically," make all new, useful,

and unobvious species of plants, animals, and insects created

by man patentable, we think the fear is far fetched."

 

We ourselves are not persuaded that the idea is so far fetched or so

illogical. If an inventor creates a new and unobvious insect which

did not exist before (and thus is not a product of nature), and can

recreate it uniformly and at will, and it is useful (for example to

destroy the spruce bud worm), then it is every bit as much a new tool

of man as a microorganism. With still higher life forms it is of

course less likely that the inventor will be able to reproduce it

at will and consistently, as more complex life forms tend to vary more

from individual to individual. But if it eventually becomes possible

to achieve such a result, and the other requirements of patentability

are met, we do not see why it should be treated differently.

 

One of those requirements is that the application satisfy Sec. 36.

That section requires applicants to describe their inventions fully so

 

...as to enable any person skilled in the art or science

to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely

connected, to make, construct, compound or use it....

 

That axiom of patent law has been stressed repeatedly in our jurisprud-

ence. It was quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Western Electric

v Baldwin (1934) S.C.R. 570 @pp. 571-573 and repeated as recently as

January 19, 1982, by the Federal Court of Appeal in Beecham & Calgon v

Proctor & Gamble, at p.9

 

...the patentee must particularly describe and ascertain

the nature of his invention. In order that, after this

privilege is expired, the public may be able to do what

the patentee has invented, a must particularly describe

and ascertain the manner in which the same is to be

performed. (22 Hals. 161, Cert. 338)

 

Section 36 requires that the application should set forth the steps

of making the invention, in this case the new microorganism. Now the

creation of a new microorganism by mutation, or by other means, is

fraught with considerable difficulty, and it is by no means certain

that the inventor, or others following his directions, will be

able to produce it again using the original method of manufacture.

However a microorganism, being living matter, will reproduce itself on

the proper culture medium, so that the inventor can maintain his

supply indefinitely. If he places samples of the organism in a culture

collection to which others have access, they too will be able to

reproduce the organism, and thus have access to his invention, and

use it once the patent expires. The question will consequently arise:

is the deposition of the invention in the culture collection sufficient

to satisfy the requirements of Section 36?

 

We do not see why it would not be. It would certainly permit others to

make the invention, i.e. the microorganism. It will enable the

public "to do what the patentee has invented," as called for by Sec. 36,

i.e. to make the microorganism, and in most instances by the easiest,

most certain, most efficient, and best mode. This, we think, satisfies

the requirement of the Act.

 

This is indeed the solution accepted by the House of Lords in the

case of the American Cyanamid Company (Dannis) Patent, 1971 RPC 42,

which recognize that deposition of a microorganism in a national culture

collection would be an adequate description of the invention in

question because a person of ordinary skill could put the invention

into practice.

 

If deposition of a microorganism in a culture collection is sufficient

disclosure of it when an applicant claims a process utilizing that

organism, it seems strange indeed to hold it is inadequate when the

organism itself is claimed.

 

In both instances the public needs the organism to work the invention,

and in both instances it has it, through the culture collection.

What we should be concerned with is making the invention available.

 

Certainly the inventor should describe his original method of production,

and with such clarity that if it can be repeated others could do

so. But if the organism can subsequently only be reproduced from

itself, we do not see why the inventor should be deprived of his

reward provided, by deposition, he makes it available to others. Indeed

where it is possible we believe he should make use of both methods of

disclosure to reduce the danger of his invention being lost to mankind.

 

The organism, to be claimed should not of course have existed pre-

viously in nature, for in that event the "inventor" did not create it,

and his "invention" is old. It must also be useful, in the sense that

it carries out some useful known objective, such as separating oil from

sand, producing antibiotics or the like. It cannot be a mere

laboratory curiosity whose only possible claim to utility is as a

starting material for further research. And it must be sufficiently

different from known species that it can be said that its creation

involved the necessary element of inventive ingenuity.

 

In the present case we believe the product claims meet these tests,

and the objection should be withdrawn.

 

G.A. Asher

Chairman

Patent Appeal Board, Canada

 

I have reviewed the prosecution of the application and considered the

recommendations of the Patent Appeal Board. I concur with the reasoning

and findings of the Board. The rejection is withdrawn. The application

is remanded to the Examiner for further prosecution consistent with

this decision.

 

J.H.A. Gariepy

Commissioner of Patents

 

Dated at Hull, Quebec

 

this 22nd. day of June, 1982

 

Agent for Applicant

 

Sim & McBurney

330 University Ave.

Toronto, Ont.

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