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   COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

 

Lack of Invention; Home Building Development

 

Selecting another use for a building after it has served its initial purpose

was held to lack inventive ingenuity in view of the art. Such change of use

does not relate to a manual art or skill that falls under Section 2 of the

Act. Rejection affirmed.

 

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This decision deals with Applicant's request for review by the Commis-

sioner of Patents of the Examiner's Final Action on application 310,519

(Class 20-7)assigned to North Oakland Development Corporation entitled

HOME BUILDING METHOD AND APPARATUS. The inventor is Leon Blachura.

The Examiner in charge issued a Final Action on November 14, 1980 re-

fusing to allow the application.

 

This invention is directed to a method of developing a residential

trait of land with completed buildings by constructing an on-site

structure which serves as a factory for manufacturing the buildings

designed for the tract until it is fully developed, and which, after

each building has been fabricated and placed, finally serves the com-

pleted development in another manner, such as a shopping center. The

method also includes creation of individual foundations for the build-

ings, as well as transportation of the buildings to the foundations and

placement thereon. Figure 1 below depicts that arrangement:

 

       <IMG>

 

In the Final Action the Examiner refused claim 1, the only claim, as

being contrary to Section 2 of the Act, and as not patentably distinguish-

ing over the following reference:

German Offenlegungsschrift

 

2,309,509 Sept.         6, 1973       Anyos et al

 

The Anyos et al publication discloses a system for development of a

tract of land which uses a large building in which are prefabricated

complete, as well as partially completed, prefabricated dwellings, and

a transporting means to move the finished units to various parts of the

tract for placement as desired, e.g. on pre-formed foundations. Figure

15 below illustrates the arrangement:

 

                             <IMG>

 

In the Final Action the Examiner stated (in part):

 

. . .

 

The cited German publication shows in figure 15, a building site

under development. There is a factory 88 in which houses are

built. The houses are then trucked to the foundation by a vehicle

and unloaded by a crane and placed on the foundation. Since the

patentee uses a temporary type of structure for his factory, it is

assumed that it would not be practical to convert it into a civic

center or whatever after the site is completed. This is the only

difference between the art and the applicant's claims. This

difference is considered to be purely and simply a matter of

choice. It is well within the skill of any tradesman to convert

Buildings into anything feasible and practical. For example,

schools have been converted into factories and factories have, no

doubt, been converted into schools. This is simply a matter of

expediency and does not amount to invention.

 

Applicant's arguments with respect to the German patent have been

considered, however, they are not persuasive. The concept of

planning a building initially with the thought that you might some-

day use for something else is old. Many homeowners have done

this. For example, many people build a 4 or 5 room house because

they have a big family and actually plan, at the outset, to convert

an extra bedroom into a study or workshop. There is no invention

in doing this.

 

Applicant's claim is further rejected in that it is contrary to

Section 2 of the Patent Act. Chapter 12, paragraph 12.03.01 (e) of

the manual of Patent Office Practice is applicable. The rejected

claim falls into the category of subject matter being a scheme or

plan or system of doing business and the like and is thus not

patentable under Section 2.

 

. . .

 

In presenting his case for allowance, Applicant argued (in part):

The Examiner rejects the claims as being obvious and well within

the skill of an ordinary tradesman to convert buildings into any-

thing feasible and practical, citing the example of the conversion

of schools to factories. However, the concept set forth in this

claim is not the mere idea of converting buildings to another use,

but rather the method of building a residential community having a

central structure usable for a number of uses. The structure being

employed is a factory building for the prefabrication of residence

buildings. That is, according to this concept, a permanent struc-

ture is erected on the site rather than the temporary structure of

the German patent and the permanent structure is then converted to

nonfactory use thereafter.

 

It is necessary to the concept to initially have such conversion in

mind at the time the residential development is being constructed

such that a structure suitable for such conversion is initially

erected.

 

Such concept is clearly not derivable from the German patent which

does not conceive, contemplate or teach such approach to construc-

tion of a residential subdivision.

 

Accordingly, the question is not merely whether it is obvious to

convert the structure from one use to another but rather whether it

is obvious to initially erect such a building with a conversion in

end use in mind. Applicant respectfully submits that based on the

prior art cited by the Examiner, such concept is clearly not

obvious.

 

The claim employs the language "factory building". It is respect-

fully submitted that the term "building" clearly distinguishes over

temporary shelters of the sort described in the German patent.

 

Webster's Dictionary defines the term "building" as "a usually

roofed and walled structure built for permanent use...". Accord-

ingly, it is respectfully submitted, "building" is a reasonably

defined term to distinguish over temporary shelters of the sort

described in the prior art reference.

 

The claim language is drawn to the concept of fabricating a per-

manent building structure on the tract in the context of carrying

out a residential development, constructing the houses in the

building and then converting the building to an after-construction

other use.

 

. . . .

 

The Examiner also asserts that the method set forth is merely a

scheme or plan or system of doing business and thus not patent-

able. Clearly, however, this claim is not directed to a manner of

doing business but rather to a physical process. That is, the pro-

cess of constructing a development complete with a large permanent

structure suitable for nonresidential use after the development has

been completed.

 

Such process of physical construction results in the production of

vendible products and can not accurately be deemed a method of

doing business and it is respectfully submitted that the Examiner's

rejection is not well founded.

 

. . . 

 

The issues before the Board are whether or not the claim is directed to

a patentable advance in the art and whether or not the claim falls

within the ambit of Section 2 of the Patent Act. Claim 1 reads:

 

A method of constructing a residential development comprising, in

combination, providing a suitable unitary tract of land; construct-

ing on the tract a factory building suitable for the simultaneous,

progressive fabrication of several dwelling houses, fabricating

complete houses in the factory building; delivering the houses from

the factory to locations on the tract and installing the houses on

the foundations; and converting the factory building on its orig-

inal site to use in providing services to the occupants of the

residential development upon termination of fabrication of the

houses and installation on the foundations.

 

We are informed by Applicant's arguments that he considers that his

 

concept is the method of building a community of structures having one

 

structure which may be employed as a factory building or for other

 

different uses. We find in the Anyos et al publication (hereafter

 

Anyos), that a central structure is used as a factory building in which

preformed full standing dwellings, or sections of dwellings, are completed,

and that thereafter, the preformed units are transported to a building site.

We derive from Anyos that Applicant's alleged new concept of using an on-site

factory building to prefabricate building units is not new as it has been

disclosed by Anyos.

we are of the view that the selection of the kind of use for a building is

a choice based on design and does not involve inventive ingenuity. It is

well known that swimming pools and tennis courts have been placed in buildings

which may be formed either with rigidly connected walls and roof, or with

air supported walls and roof. Further, the use to which a building is put

depends to a large extent on the cost. Thus, we believe that the selection

of a building which has rigidly supported walls and roof, or air supported walls

and roof, is a matter of choice of design influenced, at least in part, by

the costs of the different designs. In view of Applicant's remarks on the

definition of'temporary' we add also, that the connotation 'temporary' to

describe a building applies equally to a building with rigidly connected walls

and roof, such as the 'temporary' buildings which were built in Ottawa during

World War II~a few of which are still standing.

 

In Applicant's arrangements we are not persuaded that the inclusion of a

'permanent' structure as the central structure rather than the 'temporary'

structure of Anyos, is an act that involves inventive ingenuity, nor are we

persuaded that selecting another use for a building after it has served its

initial purpose amounts to invention. It is our view that the uses envisaged

may involve planning and organizing the sequence to be followed, but we are

satisfied that inventive ingenuity has not been exercised.

 

In summary we are satisfied that claim 1 is not directed to a patentable advance

in the art in view of the cited reference. This is assuming, arguendo, that

the subject matter falls under Section 2 of the Patent Act.

 

From the above it appears academic whether or not the subject matter falls

under Section 2 of the Patent Act, because we have found nothing patentable.

The method in question is directed to different uses for a building in a

residential development. t9e will, however, comment on the matter.

 

In determining whether Applicant's conversion of a factory building to a

different use relates to a scheme or plan or system of doing business, we believe it

is pertinent to the issue to state that conversions of buildings to different

purposes is extremely well known. By way of example, we refer to buildings such

as a department store, or a factory, or an airplane hangar, or a garage which

have been converted to various other respective uses such as office space, or

warehouse, or sports area, or bedroom space, as accommodation needs for business

or housing dictate. We are of the view that the determination of the above kinds

of conversion falls within the skills of an architect or a planning consultant.

Thus, we believe that Applicant's proposal to convert a building to another use

on completion of the development falls into the category of a scheme or plan

or system related to a business proposal. Therefore, we are satisfied that

Applicant's proposed change of use aptly falls within the confines of the skills

exercised by an architect or a planning consultant, and does not relate to a

manual art or skill that falls under Section 2 of the Act.

 

We recommend, therefore, that claim 1 be refused as failing to define a patentable

advance in the art in view of the cited art, and further that the application should not

be considered as defining subject matter that is an invention within the meaning

of Section 2 of the Act.

 

J.F. Hughes                               M. Brown                           

Assistant Chairman                        Member

Patent Appeal Board, Canada

 

I concur with the reasoning and findings of the Patent Appeal Board. Accord-

ingly, I refuse to grant a patent. The Applicant has six months within which

to appeal my decision under the provisions of Section 44 of the Act.

 

J.H.A. Gari‚py

Commissioner of Patents

 

Dated at Hull, Quebec

this 2nd. day of April, 1982

Agent for Applicant

Smart &, Biggar

Box 2999, Station D,

Ottawa, Ont.

K1P 5Y6

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