COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
Support for Claims, Secs. 41 & 36 - Benzenesulfonyl-ureas
Applicant claimed several processes to prepare new medicines. It was held that
several of the processes had not sufficiently adequately met the requirements
of Sections 41 & 36. Rejection affirmed.
*************
A hearing was held on June 18, 1980 to review the final rejection
of patent application 178,117 Class 260-235.95. The applicant
is Farbwerke Hoechst AG, assignee of R. Weyer, W. Aumuller,
V. Hitzel and F.H. Schmidt. Mr. D.M. Rogers represented the
applicant at the hearing. The application is directed to the
preparation of certain benzene sulfonyl urea derivatives which
are said to possess hypoglycemic properties, and to be useful in
pharmaceutical preparations for lowering blood sugar levels.
To illustrate the scope of the subject matter claimed, claim 1
is reproduced below:
1. A process for preparing a benzenesulfonyl-urea of
the formula I
(See formula 1)
wherein X represents a pyridyl, a pyrimidinyl, a
quinolyl, a benzthiazolyl or a benzoxazolyl group
which groups may be substituted by one or two methyl
groups and which in vicinal position to the nitrogen
atom are linked to the rest of the molecule,
R represents alkyl having 1 to 3 carbon atoms, R1
represents alkyl having 3 to 6 carbon atoms, cycloalkyl,
alkylcycloalkyl, cycloalkylalkyl, cycloalkenyl,
alkylcycloalkenyl having each 5 to 9 carbon atoms,
cyclolhexenylmethyl, chlorocyclohexyl, bicycloheptenylmethyl,
bicycloheptylmethyl, bicycloheptenyl, bicycloheptyl,
nortricyclyl, adamantyl and benzyl,
in which
(a) a benzenesulfonyl-isocyanate, benzenesulfonyl-carbamic
acid ester, -thiolcarbamic acid ester, sulfonyl-urea,
sulfonyl-semicarbazide or -semicarbazone substituted in
the 4-position by the group
(See formula 1)
is reacted with an amine R1-NH2 or a salt thereof or a
sulfonamide of the formula
<IMG>
or a salt thereof is reacted with a R1-substituted
isocyanate, carbamic acid ester, thiolcarbamic acid
ester, carbamoyl halide or urea,
(b) a correspondingly substituted benzenesulfonylisourea
ether, -thiourea ether, - parabanic acid or haloformic
acid amidine is split,
(c) the sulfur atom in a benzenesulfonyl-thiourea
substituted by the group
<IMG>
is replaced by an oxygen atom,
(d) a correspondingly substituted benzenesulfinyl- or
sulfenyl-urea is oxidized,
(e) the radical
<IMG>
is introduced into a benzenesulfonyl-urea of the formula
<IMG>
in one or more steps,
(f) a correspondingly substituted benzene-sulfonyl
halide is reacted with a R1-substituted urea or an
alkali salt thereof, or a correspondingly substituted
benzenesulfinic acid halide or, in the presence of an
acid condensation agent, a correspondingly substituted
sulfinic acid or an alkali salt thereof is reacted with
a N-R1-N' -hydroxy-urea.
It may be noted that this process claim is directed to producing over
140,000 different compounds and encompasses hundreds of thousands of
separate processes for preparing them.
The application also includes product-by-process claims corresponding
to the alternative processes (a) - (f) claimed.
The examiner rejected the following parts of the process claims:
(i) in claim 1 (a) references to sulfonyl urea, semi
carbazide and semicarbazone
(ii) in claim 1(b) references to parabanic acid, and
halo formic acid amidine
(iii) in claim 1 (c) the phrase "and in which water...
intermediate"
(iv) in claim 1 process variants (d), (e) and (f)
(v) the corresponding portions as they appear in
claims 3, 5 and 7
(vi) claims 9, 11 and 13
His reasons for rejecting these processes may be summarized
as follows:
These claims are rejected for lack of support in
the disclosure in that the several process variations
are not sufficiently described.
The basis for the objection is found in Section
41(1) and Section 36(1) of the Patent Act.
The examiner discussed the requirements of Section 41(1) of
the Act by saying:
The provisions of Section 41(1) of the Act convey
the importance of the process since the enactment
prohibits claims to the substance itself
"except when prepared or produced by the methods
or processes of manufacture particularly described
and claimed or by their obvious chemical equivalents."
The use of the phrase "particularly described and
claimed" immediately suggests a greater emphasis
on the description necessary in the disclosure for
the process. In fact in Boehringer and Sohn v.
Bell Craig 1962 F.x. C.R. 201 at page 237 the judge
felt that
"The only processes for the preparation of ...
which, in my opinion, can be said to be particularly
described anywhere in the specification are
those described in examples 2 and 9".
In the same decision on appeal to the Supreme Court
1963 S.C.R. 410 the court said at page 414
"The subsection (41(1)) was intended to place
strict limitations upon claims for substances
produced by a chemical process intended for
food or medicine. Such a substance cannot
be claimed by itself. It can only be claimed
when produced by a particular process of
manufacture. Not only that, the claimant must
claim, not only the substance, but that very
process by which it is manufactured ... "
(emphasis by examiner).
The examiner then turned his attention to Section 36(1) of
the Act, saying:
In discussing Section 36 (then Section 35) in
R.C.A. v. Raytheon (1956 - 1960) Ex. C. R. 98
at 109 the court indicated that the onus on the
disclosure placed by the Section was both heavy
and exacting. Thus at page 108
"It is a cardinal principle of patent law
that on inventor may not validly claim
what he has not described. In patent law
jargon it is said that the disclosures of
the specification must support the claims.
If they do not, the claims are invalid.
Moreover, there is a statutory duty of
disclosure and description that must be
complied with if a claim for an invention
is to stand ...".
The court thereafter approved several passages,
found in Mineral Separation v. Noranda Mines
1947 Ex. C. R. 306, at page 316
"The purpose underlying this requirement is
that when the period of monopoly has expired
the public will be able, having only the
specification, to make the same successful
use of the invention as the inventor could
at the time of his application."
and, also at page 316
"It must, not for example direct the use of
alternative methods of putting (the invention)
into effect if only one is practicable, even
if persons skilled in the art would be likely
to choose the practicable method"
and at page 317
"The description must also give all information
that is necessary for successful operation or
use of the invention without leaving such result
to the chance of successful experiment, and if
warnings are required in order to avert failures
such warning must be given".
Another case of importance in assessing the sufficiency
of description required to validly claim a process is
the Sandoz v. Gilcross 1974 S.C.R. 1336 decision. In
this case the Supreme Court upheld the Patent Office
view that exemplification of a condensation involving
a chloro ethane derivative together with a general
description using the bromo-ethane derivative was
sufficient to claim both bromo and chloro in the
same process. Thus at page 1338 the court said
"Claims 2 and 3 cover the same process using the
chloro-ethane and bromo ethane amide respectively."
(emphasis by examiner).
In applying the above criteria to the process of claim 1, the
examiner made the following comments, inter alia:
Firstly, process variant, (d), (c) and (f) of claim
I will be considered. These processes are not
exemplified but merely set down in general terms.
As such they fail to meet the principles or tests
discussed above. The disclorure fails to indicate
the particular way in which these variations must be
adapted to produce the desired result and therefore
does not show their utility in the preparation of the
compounds claimed. Furhter the disclosure does not
show the practicability of such methods. There, is no
indication of the specific reaction conditions which
are necessary to successfully carry out the processes.
In fact the disclosure invites a man skilled in the
art to carry out experiments to ascertain the reaction
pararmeters to enable him to make use of these processes.
The correctness of this analysis of the disclosure
regarding the above stated process variants is aptly
shown when thw actual description in the disclosure is
examined. The description is replete with what "may"
be done e.g. "the reaction conditions ... may ... be
modified ...with ... solvents or without solvents",
"Depending on the nature ... a small yied ... may ...",
"the expert will have no difficulty in synthesizing ...".
Thus the disclosure is not a description of how to carry
out the process but more of an invitation to try.
Secondly, process variant 1 (a) and 1(b) will be
considered.
Claim 1 (a) encompasses the reaction between a benzene
sulfonyl - isocyanate
-carbamie acid ester
-thiolcarbamic acid ester
-sulfonyl urea
-sulfonyl semicarbazide
or -semicarbazone
with the other half of the molecule R1-NH2 and the
reverse procedure i.e.
benzene sulfonyl amide with R1 - isocyanate
- carbamic acid ester
etc.
Exemple 1 describes the process benzene sulfonamide with
the isocyanante.
Exemple 2 describes the process benzene sulfonamide-carbamic
acid ester with the amine.
Thus a complete description via the issocyanate and carbamic
acid ester is provided. From the Sandoz v. Gilcross
supra decision the thiol carbamic acid ester can be
considered as the same process involving the thio
analogue, no objection is made to them. However such
an extension cannot be made to the other groups i.e.
sulfonyl urea, semi-carbazide and semicarbazone. These
cannot be considered to be the same process since in
effect they are a transmination i.e. the R1 NH2 replaces;
the urea NH2.
-6-
in the vein he found fault with process claims 1(b) and 1(c).
The examiner rebutted arguments presented by applicant in
previous amendments in the following manner:
In its response the applicant relied heavily on
the decision Ciba v. Commissioner 1959 S.C.R. 378.
In essence this case extends patentability to a
"classical" chemical process if the resulting product
is novel, useful and unobvious. The applicant
extends this principle to state that all "classical"
routes for preparing its new, unobvious drug are
patentable as long as the disclosure makes a reference
to them.
It is accepted that all the processes claimed in
claim 1 are "classical" i.e. chemical synthetic routes
which in themselves are known. However it is not
accepted that the Ciba decision overrides the statutory
requirements of Section 36 as enunciated above. In
fact in the Ciba decision the "classical" process
was fully described in the application so that
sufficiency of description was not the problem litigated.
Consequently the Ciba decision cannot be construed as
an invitation to ignore Section 41(1) and Section 36
of the Patent Act.
The applicant also drew attention to the Commissioner's
decision which resulted in Canadian Patent 1,011,738,
June 7, 1977. The penultimate paragraph of that decision
clearly distinguishes the disclosure of that application/
patent from the present one
"It is also important in our view that it be
clearly indicated in the original disclosure
that the process has been carried out and is
operative. A reference, to a "possible" process
for preparing the products would we think be
speculation, and not meet that test. In this
disclosure, however we find clear indications
that the process has been tried and operates.
For example in describing process (e) on page 7
of the specification the solvents used, the
temperatures employed, and information about the
reaction are given in some detail".
If one applies these sentiments to the present disclosure,
it is clear that there is insufficient description. The
processes are speculative i.e. repeated references to
what "may" be done, no details regarding solvent,
temperatures or reaction conditions.
Finally , the applicant refers to various patents,
texts and articles where reference is made to some
of the claimed processes. Since the applicant has
to go elsewhere for presumably adequate descriptions
of its processes this would indicate that the
objections are truly well founded, i.e that the
present disclosure is insufficient to support the
claims. If on the other hand the texts are cited
to show that the processes are "classical" i.e.
known in themselves, but not applied to the instant
reactants this point is accepted. However, this does
not aid the applicant because as stated above this
disclosure does not indicate how the applicant has
reacted the particular reactants required in each
instance to make the products of the alleged invention.
Responding to the Final Action, applicant deleted the objectionable
expression in claim 1(c) and gave his assessment of what is
required under Section (1) and Section 36(1) of the Patent Act.
In his response he argued as follows:
It should be remembered that the invention in
question here is the discovery that the compounds
have a particular utility and not in the process
by which these compounds are produced. As in
Ciba v. Commissioner of Patents (1959) S.C.R. 378,
the process is patentable because of the utility of
the products. The Examiner relies on section 41(1)
of the Patent Act and points out that this section
requires that products coming within the section
may be claimed only when prepared or produced by
the methods or processes of manufacture particularly
described and claimed or by their obvious chemical
equivalents. It is pointed out that this section
does not set forth a requirement for disclosure,
but merely defines the type of claims which must
be made in the case of compounds coming within section
41(1). As indicated in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada, in Boehringer v. Bell- Craig, (1963)
S.C.R. 410, referred to by the Examiner, in the case
of such products, the applicant must claim "that very
process by which it is manufactured." However, it has
been made clear by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Sandoz v. Gilcross, (1974) S.C.R. 1336, that there is
no necessity under Section 41(1) to describe each
process claimed in full detail.
It is submitted that section 41(1) merely sets
forth requirements as to how products coming
within the section must be claimed, and if the
claims are in accordance with the requirements
of the section, the sufficiency of the
disclosure necessary to support such claims is
the same as for any other invention. The
requirements for disclosure are set forth in
section 36(1) of the Patent Act, and it
is submitted that this section merely requires
that the disclosure be sufficient to enable one
skilled in the art to carry out the invention
claimed. This has been held to be the case
consistently in a large number of court decisions.
For exemple, in B.V.D. v. Canadian Celanese,
(1936) Ex. C.R. 140, Mr. Justice MacLean held
the following:
"Where a specification describes an invention
sufficiently clearly to enable a reasonably
skilled workman to make use of it, even
though some experiments are necessary, the
patent will be good so long as those
experiments do not require any exercise of
the inventive faculty".
Dealing specifically with processes (a) to (f) of claim 1,
applicant asserted that the specification contained a general
description of these processes and that, further, the processes
to which objection was made are well known to those skilled in
art. For the purpose of demonstrating the latter be made
reference to the patent literature such as Canadian Patent
849,015. The basis of his argument is:
It is submitted that the disclosure in the
present case is sufficient to enable one skilled
in the art to carry out each of the processes,
and while all details of the actual method of
applying the process to the particular starting
materials may not be given, this would not
require the exercise of any inventive faculty.
Prior to the hearing, applicant submitted copies of certain
affidavits which were alleged to support his contention that
the disclosure was sufficient for a man skilled in the art to
use processes (d) and (f) to prepare the benzenesulfonyl ureas
claimed.
We have considered the arguments made at the hearing by Mr Rogers
as well as those raised during prosecution of the application.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the issue to
be resolved is whether applicant has satisfied Section 36 of the
Act and Section 41.
Applicant has argued that there is no necessity under Section
41 (1) to describe each process claimed in full detail. This
view is difficult to rationalize with the words used in Section
41 , viz; "particularly described" . In our view, this means that
the process must have been described in the disclosure sufficiently
so that there is clear indication than it has been carried out.
A mere reference to a process is not evidence that the process
has in fact been accepted.
The basis for applicant's conclusion appears to be Sandoz v.
Gilcross (supra) , but the factual situation there is different
from that now before us. In Sandoz the same process using a
chloro-or a bromo-ethane derivative was claimed with only the
chloro-ethane process specifically described. It was decided
that the claim for the process using the bromo-ethane derivative
was valid. However, we are dealing here with different processes
to make the same compound. There processes differ in part by
virtue of the different reactants used in processes (a) to (f)
of the claim and also by necessity for the different reaction
conditions in each of the processes. It is relatively easy to
predict the behaviour of other members of an homologous series,
such as the halogen ethane derivatives, from the behaviour of
one member of that series, whereas it is quite a different matter
to make predictions about the behaviour of the carbamic acid
derivatives from non-homologues. For example, it is known that
the simple carbamic or thiocarbamic acid esters are generally
insoluble in water, whereas water is a useful solvent for urea
and carbazide.
Applicants processes are neither "specifically described" or
"specifically referred to". A mere recitation that A is reacted
with B does not come within the framework of the expression
"specifically referred to" (see Commissioner v Winthrop Chemical
Co 7 C.P.R. 59 S.C. 1948).
The words "particularly described" have been considered in
Commissioner v Winthrop supra , at page 64 as follows:
"According to the Oxford Dictionary "describe"
means, inter alia, "to give a detailed or
graphic account of" (which is said to be the
ordinary current sense); "to set forth in
delineation"; "to delineate". "Particular",
by the same authority, means, inter alia,
relating to or dealing with the separate
parts, elements, or details of a whole;
detailed, minute, circumstantial"; "a minute
account, description or enumeration".
(emphasis added).
We find that the description in the disclosure of the rejected
processes does not come within the purview of the above passage.
There is no indication in the disclosure that the rejected
processes have in fact been carried out. Such processes are
merely "possible to prepare the compounds. There
is no description whatsoever of any reaction conditions, such as
temperature, solvents, pH etc. There is even a hedging statement
in the disclosure that some processes will not work (see page 6,
line 18) Applicant has argued that a person skilled in the art
would know what to do in those processes which are not
"specifically described" but then suggests, in the disclosure, that
such a nice person would not know whether a given process would produce
the desired product. However, this person is described to try the
other processes with the assurance that at least one of them will
work. This shows that applicant is claiming processes which have
not been tried, since he doesn't know which processes are operable
to produce a given product.
The affidavits submitted by applicant about process variants (d),
(e) and (f) are alleged to demonstrate that the disclosure is
sufficient to enable a chemist skilled in the art to carry out
these processes. However, the issue is not whether those skilled
in the art could carry out the invention by 1978 or 1980, when
the affidavits were filed, but by the date of filing the application
i.e. August 7 ,1972 given the present disclosure and the knowledge
of those skilled in the art at that date. It is noted that the
affiants are employees of the applicant, who would undoubtedly
be aware of this development in their firm by 1978 and 1980. Thus
it may take no ingenuity on their part and at that date to carry
out these processes. We do not believe that information which is
privileged to an applicant and his employees is satisfactory
criteria to show what those skilled in the art generally would
comprehend by the invention. We note that the affidavits do not
comply with the requirements of the Canada Evidence Act and
consequently are dubious value (of Kemanond v P.P.G. Industries,
F.C.C. April 2, 1980).
We referred at the start to the large number of compounds and
individual processes covered by the claims. By virtue of that
very number it is inconceivable that applicant prepared a
substantial proportion of the compounds, or indeed that a
substantial proportion would be useful medicaments. It is well
known that slight variations in molecular structure can produce
devastating changes in the medicinal activity of a chemical
compound . In the present case the core of the invention is
the product or products produced. The processes in themselves
are conventional, as applicant has demonstrated. Claim 1 covers
all the conceivable ways of making the product and for that
reason comes close to excluding anyone else from making the
compounds.
It is a principle of patent law that an applicant may not claim
anything not properly and adequately disclosed (see R.C.A.v
Raytheon (1956-60) Ex. C.R. 98 at 108 & 109; Noranda Mines
v. Mineral Separation (1949) Ex C.R. 306 @ 316; French's
Complex Ore v. Electrolytic Zinc 1930 S.C.R. 462 at 470;
B.V.P. v Canadian Celanese 1936 Ex. C.R. 137 and 1937 S.C.R. 22;
Smith Incubator v Seiling 1937 S.C.R. 251; Gilbert v Sandoz
(1971) 64 C.P.R. 7 at 42 - 45; and Rh“ne-Poulenc CIBA v Gilbert
1966 Ex. C.R. 59 & 1967 S.C.R. 45.
In Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v Gilbert (1965) 1966 S.C.R. 187 at
731 the Court held the claims invalid for "preposterous overclaiming
because it could not be said that "all, or substantially all
members of the class of sulphonyl ureas defined in them possess
some previously unknown usefulness."
We believe a process claim is bad if it claims so broadly as to
encompass the production of inoperative species, or so broadly
that it is improbable that a substantial number of the substances
made by it do not possess the utility claimed for them. It
should not be speculative, nor encompass large number of compounds
which have never been prepared.
In Boehringer Sohn v Bell Craig, 1962 Ex. C.R. 201 we find;
... a patent purporting to give an exclusive
property in more than the inventor has invented
is also contrary to what statute authorizes
... (p. 239)
and
... a patent which includes in its specification
a claim which claims more than the inventor
has invented purports to grant an exclusive
property in more than the inventor has
invented and at least in so far as that claim
is concerned the patent, in my opinion, is not
granted under the authority of the statute and
is therefore not lawfully obtained ... a claim
which is invalid because it claims more than
the inventor invented is an outlaw and its
existence as defining the grant of a property
right is not to be recognized as having any
validity or effect (p.241).
Mr Justice Thurlow found the claim in suit to be too broad be~
it covered a large number of substances of which only a limited
number had been prepared. The Supreme Court (1963 S.C.R. 410
at 412)supported his findings. The Boehringer Sohn case involved
pharmacological substances whose properties may be less predictable
that other chemical substances, and the group of compounds claimed
was extremely large. Similar conclusions in comparable
circumstances were reached in Hoechst v. Gilbert (1964) vol.1,
Ex. C.R. 710 and 1966 S.C.R. 189, and in Re May and Baker (1948)
65 R.P.C. 255, (1949) 66 RPC 8 and (1950) 67 R.P.C. 23. The
Supreme Court, in the Hoechst decision, adopted the view that
"no one could obtain a valid patent for an unproved and untested
hypothesis in an uncharted field." The dangers of speculative
claiming were also explored in Soci‚t‚ Rh“ne-Poulenc v Ciba
(1967) 35 F.P.C. 174 at 201-205 and 1968 S.C.R. 950 in which
a broad claim was found invalid because the majority of the
substances of the claim had never been made or tested by anyone.
Objections of this nature are not, however, limited to
pharmaceutical inventions, or even to chemical inventions. In
the Matter of Abraham Lsau et al (1936) 49 R.P.C. 85, it was said
of an electrical apparatus that
I think that it is most desirable that patentees in
such circumstances should realize that it is not
the practice of the Patent Office to allow
broad and indeterminate claims of a speculative
character, and that if they put such claims into
their complete specification, they must expect to
find then disallowed unless they are able to give
a sufficiently detailed and full description to
support them.
In the Matter of Shell Development, (1947) 64 R.P.C. 151 the
application involved a process for operating organic mixtures
with sulfolane solvents. The ten detailed examples dealt with
separations where the organic mixtures were all hydrocarbons,
and while there was no detailed description of processes involving
other organic mixtures, the specification listed some forty mixtures
other than hydrocarbons. In the finding the claim too broad, the
Patent Tribunal stated:
It is, I think, sufficient to say that from the
specification it appears, first, that the prior
art consists in the separation of organic mixtures
by the use of well known solvents; secondly that
the extent to which the field, namely, the separation
of organic mixtures by the use of solvents has
been explored does not appear on the face of the
specification, but, upon a fair reading of the
document, I am satisfied that it does not assert,
putting the matter at its highest, that anything like
the whole of that field has been explored; thirdly,
that the Applicant's claim that the employment of their
sulfolane solvents, of which they give in the
specification a list of over one hundred, gave
results which compare advantageously with other
solvents hitherto used; fourthly, that the Applicants
make clear that the methods of employing their
sulfolane solvents are those which are already well
known in relation to the prior art; fifthly, that
the Applicants in their specification gave particulars
of ten experiments, all, of which deal with
hydrocarbons. It is further, in my view, a fair
reading of the specification that the solvent effect
of the sulfolanes has been explored by the Applicants
primarily in regard to hydrocarbons. It is true that
on page 4 of the specification other examples of
organic compounds are referred to which, it is
stated , "may be separated by the selective solvents
of this invention"; but, even so, with the addition
of those substances, only the fringe of the field
in question is touched.
See also Rohm & Haas v. Commissioner of Patents, (1959) Ex.
C.R. 153 where claims were refused for being too broad and
going beyond the invention made, Vidal Dyes v. Levenstein (1912)
29 R.P.C. 245, and Eastman Kodak's Application (1970) R.P.C.
548 at 561-563.
The problem before us is not peculiar to Canadian or British
jurisprudence. It has also been considered in the United States,
for example, in In re Stokal et al, 113 USPQ 283 (1957).
When we turn to the specification now before us, we find that
many of the processes are merely proposed processes for making
the desired compounds, and such processes are described as
possible ways to make products. Indeed the whole disclosure
in so far as it relates to the processes is so rife with indications
of what might possibly be done, and so replete with various
alternatives and suggestions for modifications that it is quite
apparent the draftsman could only have been speculating and casting
his net far beyond what had really been done. It is only when
we turn to the examples themselves that we can perceive any
concrete statements about processes really used. In our view
to allow the applicant to claim as widely as he proposes. To
do so would be to condone "arm-chair inventioneering" and "paper
chemistry" of the type censured in the decisions discussed above.
We are of the opinion that in claim 1 processes (a) where it
refers to sulfonyl urea, semicarbazide and semicarbazone,(b),
where it refers to parabanic acid, and haloformic acid amide,
and (d), (e), (f) and process claims 3,5,7,9,11, 13 lack
sufficient support in the disclosure in view of the requirements
of both Section 36(1) and Section 41(1) of the Patent Act. We
therefore recommend that these claims be refused, affirming the
rejection made by the examiner. We note that product claims
dependent on the refused process claims would also fall with the pro-
cess claims under the authority of the Commissioner v Winthrop supra.
Gordon Asher,
Chairman,
Patent Appeal Board, Canada
I concur with the reasoning and findings of the Board, and
reject claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 18.
J.A.Brown
Acting Commissioner of Patents
Dated at Hull, Quebec
this 30th. day of December, 1980
Agent for Applicant
Rogers, Bereskin & Parr
P.O. Box 313
Commerce Court Postal Station
Toronto, Ontario
M5L 1G1