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                            COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

 

Section 36(2): Cable Splice Repair Sleeve

 

The applicant is entitled to claims which accurately define the inventive

concept. The invention made is broad, and the claim need not in this case

be restricted to the preferred embodiment.

 

Final Action: Reversed

 

                           ******************

 

Patent application 138,599 (Class 339-47.1), was filed on March 30, 1972

for an invention entitled "Cable Splice." The inventor is Duane D. Rodger,

(assignor to Raychem Corporation). The examiner in charge of the applica-

tion took a Final Action on May 26, 1977 refusing to allow it to proceed

to patent.

 

This application relates to repair sleeve suitable for splicing electrical

cables, such as those used in underground coal mines. The sleeve is made

of a polymeric material which has been radially expanded from an original

heat-stable form to a dimensionally heat-unstable form which shrinks upon

the application of heat. The sleeve is fitted over the splicing joint, is

then heated, and shrinks back to its unextended form to form a tight

covering over the joint. This permits cables to be spliced in the mine,

rather than taking them above ground for repairs. The invention is illus-

trated by figure 3 and in particular by figure 6 of the drawings.

 

<IMGS>

 

In the Final Action the examiner rejected claim 1 under Sec. 36(2) of

the Final Action for "not stating distinctly and in explicit terms the

thing that the applicant regards as new." Claim 1 reads:

 

An article comprising a sleeve of polymer is material which sleeve

has been radially expanded from an original heat-stable form to

a form in which it is independently dimensionally belt-unstable

and is capable of shrinking in the direction of its original form

upon the application of heat alone, the sleeve having a tensile

strength of at least about 1200 p.s.i. when measured in accord-

ance with ASTM D 2671 using a jaw separation speed of 20 ~ 2

inches per minute, a maximum stiffness of 10,000 p.s.i. when

measured according to ASTM D 747 and a dielectric strength of

at least 200 volts per mil determined in accordance with ASTM D 149,

and at least part of the inner surface of the sleeve being provided

with an adhesive.

 

In making his objection the examiner said (in part):

 

The alleged invention disclosed by the applicant is to a composition

of material suitable for making sleeves to cover a cable splice

used in the mining industry. To find a solution to the problem

in existing sleeves, applicant decided to increase the flexibility

of the material in which the mayor polymeric component was polyethylene.

He made the following composition: - 40-50% (about 45%) an ethylene

vinyl acetate copolymer (e..g. "ALATHON 3190"); up to about 10%

(about 7%) an ethylene ethyl arcylate copolymer; 10-20% (about 15%)

carbon black; up to about 25% flame retardant (about 18%) a

halogenated bis-imide; up to 10% (about 6%) antimony oxide; the

remainder being anti-oxidants and chemical cross-linking agents

(example a peroxide).

 

Having made the compound a series of tests were made to determine

the physical properties of the compound. As was expected in in-

creasing the flexibility, the tensile strength was reduced from

that of previous material. However, the overall properties were

such that the use of the material as a sleeve, overcame the

problems previously encountered, without preventing the splice as

a whole from meeting the statutory requirements.

 

Applicant did not invent the physical properties but rather the

compound that exhibited the physical properties as defined in

claim 1. As the alleged invention is to a composition the

claims must define the ingredients. If the same test results

can be obtained from "a family" of ingredients then a Markush

type claim should be considered to name the ingredients.

 

He is prepared to allow claims which are restricted to the novel composition

disclosed.

 

In response to the Final Action the applicant stated (in part):

 

 ...

 

Applicant has already stated in prosecution, and now repeats, that

his invention is based upon the realisation that, contrary to all

expectation, the novel articles defined in Claim 1 have substantial

and unexpected advantages. While that inventive concept is of

course exemplified by sleeves made from the particular compositions

set out in the specification, it is well settled law that an

Applicant is entitled to claims which accurately define his

inventive concept and that he should not be forced to restrict

his claims to the specific embodiment thereof. Especially is this

so in the present case, in which (as the prosecution history shows)

those skilled in the art will readily be able to prepare a wide

variety of sleeves which are within the score of Claim 1 now on

file, but which would be outside the scope of a claim restricted

to sleeves made from the particular compositions shown in the

specification. While it is not entirely clear what the Examiner

meant when he said that "Applicant did not invent the physical

properties", it is submitted that the Examiner was clearly wrong

if he was concluding that Applicant did not invent sleeves

having the combination of physical properties set out in claim 1.

Again it must be emphasised that at no stage has it been suggested

that sleeves as defined in Claim 1 are not novel and inventive.

 

Also, it should perhaps be added, for the sake of completeness,

that during the earlier prosecution of the application, the

Examiner rejected the claims as being too broad in view of the

disclosure, and that this objection was not repeated after

Applicant had shown in detail, in his letters of 20 May and

9 July, 1976, and the affidavits referred to therein, that there

was no substance in that objection.

 

...

 

The question to be answered is whether claim 1 complies with Section 36 of

the Patent Act.

 

It is the examiner's position that since the applicant developed a new

composition for a particular purpose from specific ingredients and then

determined its physical properties, he may claim only this specific composition.

He argues that the applicant "did not invent the physical properties but

rather the composition that exhibited the physical properties defined in

claim 1".

 

On the other hand the applicant maintains that he is entitled to claims which

accurately define the full inventive concept, and should not be forced to

restrict them to a specific embodiment of that concept.

 

In weighing that contention we have had recourse to Bergeon v De Kermor Electric

1927 Ex. C.R. 181 at 196, where we find:

 

It was held in Denuing Wire and Fence Co. v. American Steel

and Wire Co (3): "That the mere function or operation

of a machine, or other device, as distinguished from the

machine or device itself, are not the subject of a patent

is well settled." end a patent covering generally any and

every means or method for producing a given result

cannot be upheld. [underlining added]

 

At the same time we should not be too astute in unduly restricting an

inventor to the specific embodiment disclosed. There is a need to balance

the needs of the inventor to claim his invention in such sufficiently

broad terms as to afford him adequate protection for what he has done, and

those of others who should not be prevented from doing what the patentee

has not invented. We find, for example, in P & M v Canada Machinery 1926

S.C.R. 105 at 118:

 

...that a claim may be well founded to the use of a principle

of manufacture so individual in form that it may be carried

out under the general direction of a skilled manufacturer

without further invention. Or if you suggest and discover

not only the principle but a means of applying it to a

practical result by a mechanical contrivance and apparatus,

and show also that you are aware "that no particular sort of

modification or form of the apparatus is essential in order

to obtain a benefit from the principle, then you may take

your patent for the mode of carrying it into etfect

and are not under the necessity of describing and confining

yourself to one form of apparatus. (British Thomson - Houston

v Corona Lamp Works 39 RPC 20)."

 

The real issue then, as we see it, is whether the applicant invented a

specific solution to a problem, in which event he may claim only that

specific solution; or whether he pointed out a general solution to a

problem, in which event he might claim the general solution. He himself

has said that:

 

...those skilled in the art will readily be able to prepare

a wide variety of sleeves which are within the scope of

claim 1 now on file, but which would be outside the scope

of a claim restricted to sleeves made from the particular

compositions shown in the specification.

 

Part of our task will be to assess the accuracy of that statement.

 

In the disclosure the inventor has specifically described two types

of copolymers as being suitable, namely ethylene-ethyl acrylate copolymers and

ethylene-vinyl acetate copolymers. He has discovered the properties required

in th a polymers used to produce the desired results. He has said that other

useful copolymers would be well known to those skilled in the art. Further,

he has pointed out on page 6 of the disclosure at line 25 to three United

States patents in which are disclosed several other polymers suitable for

use in his sleeve. As a result we are satisfied that the inventor has

developed a general solution to the problem, and should be allowed to claim

broadly. We find that the specification defines the physical properties

of the articles to be used, and that the specification enables a person

skilled in the art to make the invention and obtain the desired results.

As no prior art has been cited suggesting that the claim is too broad because

of prior art, we find that claim 1 does meet the requirements of section

36(2) of the Patent Act and the scope of monopoly need not, under these

circumstances, be limited to the preferred embodiment.

 

We recommend that the Final Action be withdrawn.

 

G. Asher                                       S.D. Kot

Chairman                                       Member

Patent Appeal Board, Canada

 

I concur with the findings of the Patent Appeal Board and withdraw the

Final Action. The application is returned to the examiner for resumption

of prosecution.

 

J. H. A. Gariepy                            Agent for Applicant

Commissioner of Patents

                                            Fetherstonhaugh & Co.

                                            Box 2999, Station D

                                            Ottawa, Ont.

Dated at Hull, Quebec

this 4th. day of January, 1979

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.