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                 COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

 

 SECTION 41(1): Includes Intermediates "Intended for Medicine"

 

 Section 41(1) applies to chemical substances not themselves medicin-

 ally or nutritionally active, where their intended use is conversion

 into medicines or foods, but not if the intended use is otherwise.

 That the subsection refers to substances "intended for medicine", is

 taken as meaning more than if it referred simply to "medicines".

 

 FINAL ACTION: Affirmed.

 

                ***********************

 

 Under Section 46(5) of the Patent Rules, the applicant has re-

 

 quested a review of the examiner's Final Action of August 30,

 

 1973, rejecting certain claims in patent application 946,848

 

 (Class 260/235.2). The application was filed on Dec. 2, 1965

 

 and has the title "6-Aminopenicillanic Acid Esters". The invent-

 

 ors are Arthur A. Patchett et al. The Patent Appeal Board

 

 conducted a hearing on the rejection on May 1, 1974, at which

 

Mr. Roger Goudreau represented the applicant, Merck & Co., Inc.

 

 The examiner has rejected claims 1 to 6 for failure to comply

 

 with the requirements of Section 41 of the Patent Act. These

 

 claims cover certain new esters of 6-aminopenicillanic aid of

 

 the general formula:

 

                        (see formula 1)

 

 where R represents various substituents. The exact chemical

 

 structure of these compounds is immaterial to the issues involved.

 

 Suffice it to say that these new compounds are intermediates

 

 which can be converted into novel penicillin compounds that possess

 

 antibacterial activity against microorganisms. According to the

 

 applicant the intermediates themselves are not medicines.

 

 In conformity with directives of the Patent Office to its examining

 

 staff (Patent Office Record, Aug. 29, 1972, p.viii and Section

 

 9.02.03 of the Manual of Patent Office Practice) the examiner re-

 

 jected the product claims because the claims do not include a

 

 restriction to the process by which they are manufactured, such as

 

 would be necessary if the compounds come within the ambit of

 

 Section 41(1) of the Patent Act. The point to be decided by the

 

 Board is whether Section 41(1) is applicable. It is agreed, at least

for the purposes of this appeal that the intermediates are not

 

medicines, and that they are made by chemical processes. What must

 

be determined, however, is whether they are "substances intended

 

for medicine".

 

In the final action it was stated:

 

... any process (involving several steps is) a unitary

concept, regardless of the number of individual

operations. This is consistent with the manner in

which most research programs are evolved: when a

scientist undertakes to synthesize a drug his inten-

tions concern the medical field from the beginning.

And later, when a patent application results, the very

patentability of the products will rest precisely

on the intended use disclosed. The intention is

therefore an essential, sine qua non, condition and

this intention is directed to the medicinal field

exclusively.

 

The application of the process limitations to inter-

mediates is therefore consistent with the wording of

Section 41(1). It is also in line with the spirit

of the Section of, inter alia,loosening the bind

created by the existence of a patent, since an unrestrict-

ed monopoly at one point in a sequence may effectively

block the complete sequence.

 

Applicants have invoked the difference in wording between

subsection 1 and 4 of Section 41 in support of their

position and they appear to believe that the language "capable

of being used in the preparation of medicine" in subsection

4 covers the intermediates, whereas the absence of such

language in subsection 1 excludes intermediates. This is

not necessarily the case: in fact it is equally logical

that "intended for medicine" includes intermediates in

both sub-sections and then, the inventions "capable of being

used in the preparation of medicine" in subsection 4 are

"processes" since without doubt, processes were intended

to be subject to licensing.

 

In his response of February 12, 1973, the applicant argued that:

 

... The position that the expression "intended for medicine"

includes intermediates is believed to be illogical and un-

founded. It is submitted that intermediates are not intended

for medicine but are inventions intended for the preparation

of medicine or in some cases capable of being used in the

preparation of medicine. It is submitted that the expression

"intended for medicine" is really equivalent to the expression

"useful as medicine".

and It has been well established by the Courts that the

scopes of Sub-section 1 and Sub-section 4 were different.

While Sub-section 1 is concerned mainly with one class

of inventions, i.e. substances prepared by a chemical

process and intended for food or medicine, Sub-section 4

includes three other classes and eliminates the restriction

of the preparation by a chemical process. The various

groups of inventions governed by Sub-section 4 are as follows:

 

a) Inventions intended for medicine

b) Inventions capable of being used as medicine

c) Inventions intended for the preparation of

medicine; and

d) Inventions capable of being used in the preparation

of medicine.

 

In order to illustrate the type of inventions which are covered

by Section 41(4) the applicant would like to submit the

following examples:

 

Inventions Intended for Medicine:

 

In this group it is submitted that two types of inventions

are concerned. First there are the inventions which are

medicines but not prepared by a chemical process, for example

an invention relating to a mixture of pharmaceutical products,

and secondly, inventions prepared by a chemical process

yielding a medicine, for example antibiotics, dieretics, etc.

It is submitted it is only this type of invention which can

be intended for medicine.

 

Inventions Capable of Being Used for Medicine:

 

This type of invention would be represented by the discovery

that a compound, capable of an industrial application, had also

been found to be capable of being used for medicine. For

example, a dye which, when discovered, was intended to be used

as a colouring agent, may subsequently become an invention

capable of being used as an antibacterial agent.

 

Inventions Intended for the Preparation of Medicine:

 

In this group one will find inventions relating to alternate

processes for preparing known drugs and one will also find

inventions relating to intermediates whose only known utility

is in the preparation of medicine.

 

Inventions Capable of Being Used in the Preparation of Medicine:

 

It is submitted that before an invention can be capable of being

used for the preparation of medicine it must be capable of doing

something else, otherwise such an invention would not be

capable of but be only intended for the preparation of medicine.

Such an invention would include, for example, a patented process

 used in general chemistry but which could under certain con-

ditions be used for the preparation of medicine. It could also be

for a produce which has already an industrial use b®t which could

be a useful intermediate in the preparation of a medicine and

finally it could even be for a machine having other industrial

applications but for which there would be an application in the

preparation of medicine.

 

It is again submitted that the expression "intended for

 medicine" as used in Section 41(1) and as used in Section

 41(4) is identical but it cannot be interpreted as in-

 cluding other expressions such as "intended for the prepara-

 tion of medicine", otherwise to argue that these two

 expressions are equivalent would be saying that in fact

 Parliament has used two different expressions to express the

 same intention. This point was clearly stated in the case of

 Charles E. Frosst & Co. vs Carter Products, 18 Fox Patent Cases

 at page 60, where the former Commissioner stated clearly as

 follows:

 

 "Furthermore, if Section 41(3) had been intended

 to apply only to patents coming under the ambit of

 Section 41(1) there would have been no point in

 using different language or in adding the word

 "any" before the word "patent". Parliament does not

 usually use different wording to express the same

 intention".

 

 There are many other decisions where the Courts or the Patent

 Office have held that there is a difference in scope between

 Sections 41(1) and 41(3). For example, in the case of

 Parke Davis vs Fine Chemical of Canada, 18 Fox Patent Cases,

 page 133, Martland J. indicated as follows:

 

 "It seems to me that Section 41 must be construed as

 a whole. Sub-section 1 applies to inventions relating to

 substances prepared or produced by chemical processes

 and intended for food or medicine. Sub-section 3 goes

 somewhat further and also applies to any patent for an

 invention capable of being used for the preparation of

 food or medicine." (Underlining ours)

 

 As can be appreciated, a clear-cut distinction has been made

 between intended for medicine and capable of being used for

 the preparation of medicine and again it is submitted that an

 intermediate is not intended for medicine but is only, at the

 most, capable of being used for the preparation of medicine.

 

 In other words, it is the conversion of an intermediate to a

 medicine which constitutes an invention intended for medicine,

 while the conversion of a starting material to a new intermediate

 useful in the preparation of medicine can only be an invention

 intended for the preparation of medicine.

 

 and

 

 That the scope of Section 41(1) and Section 41(4) are not the

 same even as far as the expression "intended for medicine" is

 also to be drawn from the language used in the French part of

 these two sub-sections. The Patent Office' attention is drawn

 to Sub-section 1, where the claims of the invention are defined

 as those "destin‚es … la medication", while Sub-section 4 refer, to

 

    "une invention destin‚e … des m‚dicaments"

 

                   ou

 

 "une invention destin‚e … la preparation de

 m‚dicaments"

 

 ou

 

 "une invention susceptible d'ˆtre utilis‚e …

 de telles fins", (c.a.d.… des m‚dicaments ou

 a la preparation de m‚dicaments)".

 

It is submitted that the expression "destinee … la

medication" can in no way be interpreted to include "une

invention destin‚e … la pr‚paration de m‚dicaments" which

is the case of an intermediate. In French the verb "destiner"

means to have a use determined in advance (fixer d'avance

pour ˆtre employer a un usage). On the other hand, "m‚dication"

means, in French, "emploi systematique d'agents m‚dicinaux

dans une intention pr‚cise".

 

Section 41(1) requires that "in the case of inventions relating to

 

substances prepared or produced by chemical processes and intended for

 

food or medicine, the specification shall not include claims for the

 

substance itself except when prepared or produced by the methods or

 

processes of manufacture particularly described and claimed or by their

 

obvious chemical equivalents." Since the invention relates to a sub-

 

stance produced by a chemical process, what we must consider is

 

whether these intermediates are "intended for food or medicine".

 

Section 41 is derived from Section 38A of the British Patents and

 

Design of 1919. There are differences between the corresponding British

 

and Canadian sections and care must be exercised in correlating the two

 

(vide Commissioner of Patents v Winthrop Chemical Co.,1948 S.C.R. 46).

 

Nevertheless it is of assistance to look to British jurisprudence

 

interpreting those parts of the legislation which are in fact similar.

 

In the matter of application for Patents by W et al, 39 RPC 263,

 

(1922), it was held that the expression "intended for food" is not

 

confined to foods so as to exclude inventions which are to become foods,

 

or substances which are used in and to advance the preparation or

 

production of food. (We are of course concerned with medicines, but the

 

principle is analogous.) To quote from the decision:

 

Turning back to sub-section (1), I cannot accept the

argument that it covers foods only, and not subjects of

inventions which are to become foods, or substances which

are used only in, and to advance, the preparation or pro-

duction of food. "Intended for food" are the word; used -

a phrase to my mind of very wide significance. Very few

substances that are within the section need no further

preparation before they are to be consumed as food. Indeed I think

it was conceded that mere cooking would not prevent a substance

being a food within sub-section (1); but, if one mode is

permissible, why not others? In my judgement, therefore, all

substances fall within sub-section (1) and are "intended for fool

or medicine" whether they are completely ready for

consumption or can be rendered ready by various opera-

tions, or are to be used in the preparation or production

of the article so to make it ready for consumption.

"Intended for food or medicine" means to be used, not

necessarily immediately and as they are, but after due

preparation - to be used when the intention has ultimately

been carried into effect, by the preparation be it by

cooking, mixing or other preliminary steps, which lead

up to effecting their ultimate purpose, namely, user (sic)

as food.

 

While there are phrases in the above passage which imply "intended

 

for medicine" is to be interpreted broadly, the facts of the case

 

(the substance was a dough to be made into bread) and other phrases

 

could be taken to suggest that the decision goes no further than to

 

cover materials which, while they require further preparation to

 

become foods or medicines, are still foods in an elementary form,

 

much as it was found in Parke-Davis v Fine Chemicals (1957)

 

Ex. C.R. 300 at 307 and (1959) S.C.R., 219 that substances in bulk

 

form are nevertheless medicines even though they required further

 

modification of a simple nature to adapt them to the dosage form

 

in which they are administered. This conceivably, however, might

 

exclude chemical intermediates which require a molecular change

 

before they are converted into the compounds possessing therapeutic

 

properties and which are those actually used as medicines.

 

In the matter of an Application for Patent by E.M., 41 RPC 590

(1924) the matter was explored further. Claims for baking powder

which is used in the making of bread were held to be within the

ambit of Section 38. This then makes it apparent that substances

'intended for food' are not restricted to elementary forms of food,

but extends to other substances "... to be used in the preparation

or production of (an) article of food..."

 

The Canadian Courts have also given a broad interpretation to

"medicine". See, for example, Tennessee Eastman v. Commissioner

of Patents, S.C.R. Dec. 22, 1972, p.8, Imperial Chemical Industries

v. Commissioner of Patents (1961) 1 Ex. C.R. 57, and Parke, Davis v.

Fine Chemicals (supra at 226.

 An important submission made by the applicant hinges upon the

 differences in the language used in Section 41(1), 4(3), and

 41(4) of the Act. These are tabulated below.

 

 41(1) - intended for food or medicine

 41(3) - intended or capable of being used for the

         preparation of food.

 

 41(4) - intended or capable of being used for medicine

         or the preparation or production of medicine

 

 It is his submission that the latter two subsections reflect a differ-

 ence between substances which are themselves medicines, and others

 which are intended for being used to prepare medicine. To quote from

 his response:

 

"...a clear-cut distinction has been made between intended

 for medicine and capable of being used for the preparation

 of medicine..."

 

 It must be remembered, however, that there are other differences,

 in wording between subsections 41(3) & (4) and subsection 41(1).,

 The former deal with "inventions" broadly, while the latter (41-1)

 deals with inventions which are substances. This explains the state-

 ment made in Parke Davis v Fine Chemicals (supra) at 327, and quoted

 by the applicant, that 41(3) goes somewhat further than 41(1). Sec-

 tions 41(3) & (4) would cover, for example, a mechanical blender

 intended for the preparation of a medicine or capable of being used

 for the preparation of medicine. They are not restricted to "substances,"

 as is 41(1). While we fully agree with the applicant that the

 subsections are of different scope, we do not see that the results

 flowing from those differences are those which he has ascribed to them.

 

 The applicant pointed out that these intermediates are not medicines.

 Since the examiner did not contend that they were, and since we are

 only concerned with whether the intemediates are "intended for

 medicines (as distinct from "being" medicines), we need not consider

 that point further.

 

The applicant has advanced another interesting argument based upon

the French text of the Patent Act, which of course is as equally

authoritive as the English version. It is his contention that the

phrase "destin‚es … la medication" in 41(1) can in no way be inter-

preted to include "une invention destin‚e … la preparation de

medicaments." As in the case of the English text, however, we

must recognize that in 41(1) we are concerned with "substances...

destin‚es … la medication" while in 41(3) & (4) we are concerned

with "une invention destin‚e … la preparation de m‚dicaments. Con-

sequently we can draw the same distinctions between the subsections

as that which has already been made in considering the English text.

 

The compounds claimed in the application are precursors for the

preparation of medicinal substances, i.e. certain novel penicillins.

By chemical conversion they are made into such medicinal substances.

The decision of both the Canadian and British Courts suggest that

"medicine" and "intended for medicine" should be given broad inter-

pretations, and on that basis we conclude that intermediates whose

only utility is for conversion into medicines should be considered

as "intended for medicine". Whether it would also apply to chemical

substances whose intended use is non-medicinal but which may also

be capable of being used to prepare medicines within the meaning of

Parke, Davis v Fine Chemicals (supra 219 at 227 we need not determine

here. if the disclosure is to be believed (page 1 and example 8) these

intermediates provide a route to make certain previously unknown

penicillins which are active against microorganism resistant to

previously known penicillins. To grant per se protection to these

intermediates would preclude others from developing alternate procedures

for making the intermediates and manufacturing the new penicillins from

such intermediates without being obliged to obtain a license, whether

voluntary or compulsory, from this applicant. In that sense,

and to that extent, a per se claim would effectively block the

way to manufacture the new penicillins.

 

If it had been meant that Section 41(1) applied only to substances

which are themselves medicines, we believe the subsection would

have read "substances prepared or produced by chemical processes

which are foods and medicines." The fact that the expression "in-

tended for food or medicine" was used suggests instead that something

more was meant.

 

The Board is of the opinion that the rejection made under Section 41

should be affirmed.

 

G.A. Asher

Chairman, Patent Appeal Board

 

I concur with the findings of the Patent Appeal Board. Claims 1 to

6 in their present form are refused. The applicant has six months

to amend the claims as required by the Examiner, or to appeal this

decision under the provisions of Section 44 of the Patent Act.

 

Decision accordingly,

 

A.M. Laidlaw,

Commissioner of Patents

 

Dated at Hull, Quebec

this 5th day of June,

1974.

 

Agent for Applicant

Goudreau, Gage & Associates

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.