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               COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

 

 INUTILITY - S. 2: Inoperable to Produce Desired Result.

 

 The alleged invention of an engine to operate "without any

 loss of energy" is contrary to scientific principles. The

 purpose for which the engine was designed was not capable

 of attainment by persons versed in the art; thus no

 benefit is conferred on the public by the alleged invention.

 

 FINAL ACTION: Affirmed.

 

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 This decision deals with a request for review by the Commissioner

 

 of Patents of the Examiner's Final Action dated April 10, 1973

 

 on application 142,930. This application was filed on May 25,

 

 1972 in the name of Haptain R. Wongh and refers to a "Pneumatic

 

 Engine."

 

 This application relates to an engine which operates on compressed

 

 air contained in a storage tank. The storage tank is recharged by

 

 pumps driven by the engine, thus allegedly, the engine requires no

 

 input of external energy to maintain operation.

 

 In the prosecution terminated by the Final Action the examiner

 

 refused the claims in view of prior art, and because the device

 

 is impractical and thus lacks utility.

 

 In the Final Action the Examiner stated in part:

 

 Reference Re-Applied

 

 Canadian Patent

 119,556  July 27, 1909  Cl.60-30 Dwgs. 2 shts. Pittman et al

 

 This application discloses an engine which operates on compressed

 

air contained in a storage tank which is recharged by pumps driven

 

 by the engine which, by operating in accordance with applicant's

 

"Law of Haptopian Introduction of Energy", requires no input of

 

 external energy to maintain operation.

 

 The above re-applied reference teaches an engine which operates

 

 on compressed air contained in a storage tank which is recharged

 

 by an air pump which may be driven by the engine. The only basic

 

 difference between applicant's engine and that of the reference is

 

 that applicant's engine allegedly requires no external energy input

to maintain operation while the engine of the reference does

require periodic recharging of compressed air from an external

energy source to maintain operation. This application has not

taken into account the frictional losses which arc inherent in

any machine and which necessitate the input of energy from an

external source to maintain operation. This application is

thus rejected as failing to show any improvement over the

teaching of the above reference. It is also pointed out that,

even if this application could be amended to provide for the

input of energy from an external source, it would still fail

to show any improvement over the prior art.

 

...

 

Referring to applicant's letter of December 15, 1972, any

discussion of applicant's "Law of Haptopian Introduction of

Energy" is pointless. The application must supply the information

required by Section 36 of the Patent Act, and Section 28(3) of

the Patent Act specifically excludes the granting of a patent

for an abstract scientific theory.

 

This application is therefore rejected as disclosing and claiming

an engine which fails to show any improvement over the prior art

and which lacks utility.

 

The applicant in his response dated June 26, 1973 to the Final

 

Action stated in part:

 

(1) That Your petitioner verily believes that he is entitled

to request the Commissioner of Patents to review the examiner's

action because he has rejected the validity of pneumatic engine

has had claimed, for the said request having regard to the

provision of the Patent Act, Rule 46(2), because the examiner

has had rejected this application for patent with two fallacy

reasons.

 

(i) The examiner has had accused this pneumatic engine which

has had no improvement over the reference engine with his false

notion about the engine frictional force which causes of lost

energy, but the frictional force which inherited in an engine is not

a phenomena of losses energy. Frictional force is a phenomena of

the degree of efficiency. Also the examiner has had ignored the

mechanism which operates the engine that played the ultimate rule

of efficiency. Therefore, the examiner's first accusation is a

fact of fallacy.

 

(ii) The examiner has had accused this engine has no utility

because his false notion which he believed that the engine's

two refilling pumps would used up the engine's useful output,

but actual these two pumps only required an input of ten horse

powers, and by removal of other frictional parts of the combustion

engine in the course of converting to pneumatic engine has given

an increase about 18 horse powers. Therefore, the examiner's

accusation is a fact of fallacy.

 

The question to be determined is whether the subject matter of the

 

application is considered to be a patentable advance in the art.

 

Claim 1 reads:

 

The Pneumatic Engine was invented through a simple conversion

of an internal combustion engine, and it serves the same

function and application as the internal combustion engine.

But the Penumatic Engine operates by a different mechanism

than the internal combustion engine. The Pneumatic Engine

is a noncombustible engine; it operates by transitional

energy, or compressed air, in a closed system of continuous

processes but without consuming any substance; because energy

cannot be created or destroyed. Energy can only be introduced

and consequently quantitatively transferable. The Pneumatic

Engine moves about by operation of its own mechanism and has

great capacity to do work. Moreover, its power and size can

be manipulated by means of tailoring its size and power according

to the need. Besides, it requires only a minimum of input in

order to produce a maximum of output. It has unique characteristics

over the internal combustion engine because it is free from pollution

because it is a noncombustible engine. It is the most economical

engine of the world today because it does not consume any substance.

Therefore, it becomes the indispensible engine for all forms of

industry and all forms of transportation.

 

The reference to Pittman discloses an engine which can be driven or

 

operated by air under compression. A description of the invention is

 

given of page 1 which reads:

 

...In the preferred application of the invention to locomotive

engines, the latter is equipped with the usual wheel driving

mechanism and cylinders with which the pumps cooperate, a

portion of these pumps being actuated solely by the movable

elements of the engine, and the remaining portion of the pumps

being manually operative and used only to start the engine and

connected to a receiving reservoir having communication by

means of suitable pipes with storage reservoirs, and the storage

reservoirs attached by conduits to a distributing reservoir

simulating the usual boiler of a locomotive.

 

Also, claim 1 of this reference reads:

 

In an air motor of the class described, a distributing reservoir

adapted to be charged at intervals from air compressing stations,

storage reservoirs connected to the distributing reservoir, a

receiving reservoir having pipe connection with the storage

reservoirs, the pipe connection being provided with cut-off

and exhaust valves, driving mechanism including cylinders and

pumps, tubular supply connections between the cylinders and

distributing reservoir, tubular connections between the pumps

and receiving and storage reservoirs, and hand pumps for charging

the distributing reservoir in the event that the pressure in the

latter runs low.

  From a consideration of claim 1 it is found that it basically

 

  relates to an engine which can be driven or operated by air under

 

  pressure. The only basic difference between the device as

 

  disclosed in this application and that of the reference is that

 

  while the present device purports to require no external energy

 

  input, the engine of the reference requires periodic recharging

 

  from an external energy source to sustain operation.

 

  It is a well established fact that friction energy losses are

 

  inherent in any machine, and therefore an input of external energy

 

  is required to replace the frictional energy losses. However,

 

  since there is no provision for an input of external energy to

 

  maintain in operation the engine described and claimed, it would

 

  operate to continuously produce a limited amount of power only so

 

  long as the supply of compressed air lasts. Furthermore, the use

 

  of pumps driven by the engine to recharge the storage tank merely

 

  reduces the usable power available in the storage tank.

 

  The applicant has disclosed and claimed what he calls a "closed

 

system process," in the form of an engine which he purports will

 

 operate without any loss of stored energy. This is succinctly

 

  stated in the annex to the response to the Final Action, at page

 

  3, which reads: "Moreover, this pneumatic engine is a multiple

 

  machine, thus it has capacity to recover that small amount of

 

  compressed air which has escaped into the atmosphere from the engine's

 

  parts and joints, because air is readily available for refilling.

 

  Hence, at the end of each operation of this pneumatic engine it has

 

  the same amount of energy in its storage (sic) tank, therefore,

 

  this pneumatic engine has optimum utility because it has no

 

  operation cost."

 The applicant has argued "that the examiner is wrong in his

 

 assessment of the invention." It is, however, a settled

 

 consideration that the frictional losses in any machine must

 

 be reconciled, and that no machine operating from a source of

 

 stored energy can perform without loss of energy. In our view,

 

 therefore, the applicant's arguments in this regard are not based

 

 on the accepted scientific principle of energy loss by friction.

 

 Accordingly, we must conclude that the applicant's theory is

 

 incorrect.

 

 Of interest in the present determination is the rationale of the

 

 Exchequer Court in Minerals Separation v. Noranda Mines Ltd.,

 

 (1947) Ex.C.R. 306, wherein Thorson P, stated at page 316:

 

 Two things must be described in the disclosures of a

 specification, one being the invention, and the other

 the operation or use of the invention as contemplated

 by the inventor, and with respect to each the description

 must be correct and full. The purpose underlying this

 requirement is that when the period of monopoly has expired

 the public will be able, having only the specification, to

 make the same successful use of the invention as the inventor

 could at the time of his application. (underlining added)

 

And at page 317 he stated:

 

 When it is said that a specification should be so written

 that after the period of monopoly has expired the public

 will be able, with only the specification, to put the

 invention to the same successful use as the inventor

 himself could do, it must be remembered that the public

 means persons skilled in the art to which the invention

 relates, for a patent specification is addressed to such

 persons.

 

      What we are concerned with in the instant circumstance is "the

 

 operation or use of the invention as contemplated by the inventor."

 

 The applicant has promised as a result of his alleged invention "an

 

 engine that will operate without any loss of energy." "This promised

 

 result" must be capable of attainment by a person skilled in the art.

 

 If this is not so, the device lacks utility in the patent sense

 

 because it is inoperable, that is, it cannot fulfill the purpose

 

 for which it was designed. See, for example, Northern Electric v

 

 Browns Theatre (1940) Ex.C.R. 36 at 56, wherein it is stated:

 

An invention to be patentable must confer on the public a

benefit. Utility as predicted of inventions means industrial

value. No patent can be granted for a worthless art or

arrangement.Here there is described and claimed something

that lacks utility because it is inoperable for the purpose

for which it was designed.

 

Also of interest is Raleigh Cycle v Miller, (1946) 63 R.P.C. 113

 

at 140 which reads:

 

In other words, protection is purchased by the promise of

results. It does not, and ought not to survive the proved

failure of the promise to produce the results.

 

In Union Carbide v Trans-Canadian Feeds (1967) 49 CPR 29 the court

 

held:

 

I conclude that the patent is bad because the specification

claims what is not useful in a patentable sense.

 

In re Le Rosair Appollo (1932) 49 RPC, the court concluded that

 

when the theory upon which a patent was founded was erroneous, there

 

was no subject matter or utility in the invention.

 

A distinction has to be made, of course, between "the promised

 

result" and a mere wrong statement of the purposes for which that

 

which is attained can be used, and between a promise of results and

 

what merely amounts to a slight exaggeration of the results.

 

Moreover, where several results are suggested, the invention will, not

 

lack utility because one of those suggestions proved over-sanguine,

 

provided such failure does not apply to the use to which the inventor

 

contemplates applying it.

 

In summary, the test of utility of an alleged invention depends on

 

whether by following the directions of the specification the

 

effects which the patentee professed to produce can be produced.

 

In other words if the result is that the object sought to be

 

obtained can be obtained and is practically useful at the time

 

when the patent is granted, the test of utility is satisfied.

 In this instance, however, the Board is satisfied that the alleged

 

 invention is met by the Pittman reference (with the distinction

 

 that Pittman provides for an input of energy from the external

 

 source), and that what is described and claimed lacks utility,

 

 because it is inoperable for the purpose for which it was designed,

 

 "a device which operates without any loss of energy. " Therefore,

 

 Sections 2 and 36 of the Patent Act have not been satisfied.

 

 The Board therefore recommends that the decision of the examiner

 

 to refuse the application for lack of subject matter be affirmed.

 

 J.F.Hughes,

 Assistant Chairman,

 Patent Appeal Board.

 

I concur with the findings of the Patent Appeal Board. Accordingly,

 

 I refuse to grant a patent on the subject matter of this application.

 

 The applicant has six months within which to appeal this decision

 

 under the provisions of Section 44 of the Patent Act.

 

 Decision accordingly,

 

 A.M. Laidlaw,

 Commissioner of Patents.

 

 Dated and Signed in

 Hull, Quebec this

 20th day of February, 1974.

 

 No Agent

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.